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Abstract
We introduce a new class of games, congestion games with failures (CGFs), which
allows for resource failures in congestion games. In a CGF, players share a common
set of resources (service providers), where each service provider (SP) may fail with
some known probability (that may be constant or depend on the congestion on the
resource). For reliability reasons, a player may choose a subset of the SPs in order
to try and perform his task. The cost of a player for utilizing any SP is a function of
the total number of players using this SP. A main feature of this setting is that the
cost for a player for successful completion of his task is the minimum of the costs of
his successful attempts. We show that although CGFs do not, in general, admit a
(generalized ordinal) potential function and the nite improvement property (and
thus are not isomorphic to congestion games), they always possess a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium. Moreover, every best reply dynamics converges to an equilib-
rium in any given CGF, and the SPs' congestion experienced in dierent equilibria
is (almost) unique. Furthermore, we provide an ecient procedure for computing
a pure strateguy equilibrium in CGFs and show that every best equilibrium (one
minimizing the sum of the players' disutilities) is semi-strong. Finally, for the sub-
class of symmetric CGFs we give a constructive characterization of best and worst
equilibria.
Key words: congestion games, resource failures, pure strategy Nash equilibrium,
price of anarchy, semi-strong Nash equilibrium, algorithms
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Consider a system consisting of two resources, a and b, where each of them can
be used in order to process a player's task, and the player chooses one of them
to perform his task. However, if the resources are not fully reliable then the
player may decide to assign his task to both resources. More generally, suppose
that there are n players who need to process their individual tasks using one
of the two identical reliable resources. The cost for each player for utilizing a
particular resource is a (nondecreasing) function of the congestion experienced
by this resource. Naturally, each player aims at minimizing his cost. An optimal
solution would be that "half" of the players will use each of the resources.
When modeled as a game, such "equal partition" is an equilibrium of the
game. However, if the resources are not reliable, the players might choose both
resources to perform their tasks. Indeed, such behavior might be obtained
in equilibrium of the corresponding game. As a result of such behavior, the
resources might be overloaded, and the cost to each player will be very high.
More generally, each player wants to maximize the probability of successful
execution of his tasks, and simultaneously, to minimize his cost; for example,
a player may prefer not to use a resource if the congestion of that resource
causes a long processing delay.
Hence, as we can see, reliability issues have signicant implications on player
behavior in congestion settings. In order to address this challenge, we introduce
a model termed congestion games with failures (CGFs), and establish several
basic results for this model. To the best of our knowledge, we were the rst to
incorporate the issue of failures into congestion games.
Following the preliminary conference version of this paper (Penn et al., 2005),
we considered another, alternative model of Congestion Games with Load-
Dependent Failures [CGLFs] (Penn et al., 2009a). Although the terms CGF
and CGLF may sound similar, these models refer to very dierent situations
and have very dierent motivation. In a CGF, players strive to minimize the
delay caused by using a set of alternative resources, and the payo of a player
is determined by the minimum of delays of the set of selected resources (and
by incompletion costs). In a CGLF, a player receives a reward in the case
of successful completion of his task, and his objective is to maximize the
dierence between the expected benet from the successful task completion
and the total cost of the utilized resources.
? A preliminary version of this paper appeared in EC-2005 (Penn et al., 2005).
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2The class of congestion games was rst introduced by Rosenthal (1973) who
proved that these games always possess a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Congestion games are noncooperative games in which a collection of players
have to choose from a nite set of alternatives (resources). The utility of a
player from using a particular resource depends only on the number of play-
ers using it, and his total utility is the sum of the utilities obtained from the
resources he uses. Congestion games have been used to model trac behavior
in road and communication networks, competition among rms for produc-
tion processes, migration of animals between dierent habitats, and received a
lot of attention in the recent computer science and electronic commerce com-
munities (Milchtaich (1996b); Orda et al. (1993); Quint and Shubik (1994);
Rosenthal (1973); Roughgarden and Tardos (2002)). Rosenthal (1973) studied
congestion games with a nite number of players. In addition, several authors
have considered non-atomic congestion games, where the \non-atomic" part
refers to the assumption that there is a continuum of players, each controlling
a negligible fraction of the overall load on the system (see, e.g., Roughgarden
and Tardos (2004); Sandholm (2001)), or, dierently, to the assumption that
a player may take continuous decisions, representing the amount of congestion
contributed by the player to each service provider (Orda et al. (1993)).
However, the above settings do not take into consideration the possibility that
resources may fail to execute their assigned tasks. Typically, the resources are
machines, computers, service providers, communication lines etc. These kinds
of resources are obviously prone to failures because of breakage or for any
other reasons. Thus, the issue of failures should not be ignored.
The notion of failures is widely used in the eld of distributed systems. In a
lot of situations failing components of the system may be viewed as playing
against its correctly functioning parts. The issue of failures in game-theoretic
setting is extensively discussed by Linial (1994). In another line of research,
Porter et al. (2002) introduced the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design
which extends the standard game-theoretic framework of mechanism design
to allow for uncertain executions. In the above settings failing components are
self-motivated or malicious players. In our work, we initiate an investigation
of failures in congestion games, where not the players, but the resources they
share may fail.
In a congestion game with failures (CGF), players share a common set of
resources, or service providers 1 , where each service provider (SP) may fail
with some known probability. For reliability reasons, a player may choose a
subset of the service providers in order to try and perform his task. Therefore,
each player's set of pure strategies coincide with the power set of the set of
SPs, and the total load on the system is not known in advance, but strategy-
dependent. The cost for a player for successful completion of his task is the
1 In this paper, we use the terms resources and service providers interchangeably.
3minimum of the costs of his successful attempts. The cost function associated
with each SP is not universal but player-specic. That is, the (dis-)utility
to a player depends not only on the number of players using the same SP,
but also on the identity of the player in question. Congestion games with
player-specic cost functions were rst studied by Milchtaich (1996a). This
generalization was, however, accompanied by the assumption that each player
chooses only one resource.
The contribution of this paper is both conceptual and technical. On the con-
ceptual level we introduce a model to handle strategic behavior in congestion
settings with unreliable resources. In addition, we provide several basic results
on the existence of various forms of equilibria in such settings.
It is known that any congestion game possesses a potential function, and as a
result possesses a pure strategy equilibrium (Monderer and Shapley (1996)).
Our rst technical contribution is by showing that although CGFs do not, in
general, admit a potential function, and thus are not isomorphic to conges-
tion games, they always possess a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover,
though, as we show, an arbitrary improvement dynamics may cycle (that is,
the nite improvement property (FIP) does not hold), the convergence to
an equilibrium is guaranteed from any strategy prole if the players make
best response improvement steps. We also develop an ecient algorithm for
computing a pure strategy equilibrium and prove that the SPs' congestion
experienced in dierent Nash equilibria is (almost) unique. Furthermore, we
consider the existence of a semi-strong equilibrium in congestion games with
failures. In a strong equilibrium (Aumann (1959)) it is required that devia-
tions by any subset of the players would not be benecial to them. This is
a much more demanding concept than the Nash equilibrium, in which only
unilateral deviations are considered. In a semi-strong equilibrium we require
that if there exists such benecial group deviation, then it should itself not be
stable: there will exist a single player among the deviators, who can gain by
deviating from the deviating strategy 2 . We show that although strong equi-
librium does not, in general, exist in CGFs, every Nash equilibrium strategy
prole that minimizes the sum of the players' disutilities is a semi-strong Nash
equilibrium.
We devote special attention to the subclass of symmetric CGFs. We use this
interesting subclass in order to dierentiate between dierent types of equi-
libria according to their social disutility (the sum of the players' disutilities).
We give a characterization of the best and worst Nash equilibria with respect
to the social disutility, present algorithms for their construction, and compare
2 Semi-strong equilibrium is a more demanding concept than coalition-proof equi-
librium (Bernheim et al. (1987); Bernheim and Whinston (1987)). In a coalition-
proof equilibrium a deviation by a subset of the players is considered stable, if there
is no stable deviation from it by any subset of it.
4the social disutilities of the players at these points. An interesting property
is that while in worst equilibrium some of the players exploit the system, the
structure of the best equilibrium is such that the system exhibits fair allocation
of resources to the players 3 .
We also consider the ratio between the social disutilities incurred by players in
an equilibrium and in an optimal outcome. The worst possible ratio between
equilibrium and optimum disutilities (dubbed "the price of anarchy" (Pa-
padimitriou (2001))) was proposed by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999)
as a measure of the ineciency of selsh behavior in noncooperative sys-
tems, and was extensively studied for nonatomic congestion games (Correa
et al. (2007); Roughgarden and Tardos (2002, 2004); Roughgarden (2005)).
Recently, Awerbuch et al. (2005) and, independently, Christodoulou and Kout-
soupias (2005) provided bounds for the price of anarchy in nite congestion
games with linear cost functions. We show that in congestion games with fail-
ures even the best possible ratio between equilibrium and optimum disutilities
(termed the "price of stability" in Anshelevich et al. (2004)) depends on the
parameters of the game and cannot be bounded by a constant value, even for
very simple (e.g., linear) cost functions. As a result, the price of anarchy is
also unbounded.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we dene our model. In Sec-
tion 3 we show that CGFs do not admit a potential function and the nite
improvement property (FIP). In Section 4 we prove the convergence of best
replies, implying the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In ad-
dition, we provide an ecient algorithm for computing and analyzing Nash
equilibrium uniqueness properties. In Section 5 we show that every best Nash
equilibrium of any given CGF is semi-strong. Section 6 is devoted to symmet-
ric CGFs where we characterize best and worst Nash equilibria in symmetric
CGFs, present algorithms for their construction and provide an upper bound
on the ratio between them. We also discuss the (best and worst possible) ratio
between social disutility in Nash equilibrium and optimum social disutility in
these games. We conclude by drawing a few directions for further research in
Section 7.
2 The Model
A CGF is dened as follows. Let N be a set of n 2 N players, and let M be a
set of m 2 N service providers, each associated with a failure probability. We
assume that the failure or success of a particular service provider is independent
of the failure or success of other SPs. Each player has a task which can be
3 The issue of fairness in congestion settings is the topic of study of several papers
(see e.g. Jahn et al. (2005); Kumar and Kleinberg. (2006))
5carried out by any of the SPs. The service cost for player i for utilizing service
provider e is a nonnegative nondecreasing function li
e : f1;:::;ng ! R+ of the
congestion experienced by e; thus, the greater is the congestion experienced
by the service provider, the longer it takes to complete the task execution and,
as a result, the greater is the cost incurred by the player. Player i's disutility
from a successful task completion is determined by the minimum of the service
costs of the SPs he has chosen which did not fail. Player i's disutility from an
uncompleted task is evaluated by his (nonnegative) incompletion cost (denoted
by Wi). This is dened more precisely below.
The success probability of e 2 M is denoted by se (se 2 (0;1)). Similarly,
fe = 1   se stands for the failure probability of e.
Remark 1 The CGF-model can be extended to allow congestion-dependent
failure/success probabilities, while leading to similar results (see Remark 8 in
Section 4 for justication). We dene these probabilities as constants solely in
order to simplify the exposition and presentation of our results.
The set of pure strategies i for player i 2 N is the power set of the set
of SPs: i = P(M). Given a subset of players S  N, the set of strategy
combinations of the members of S is denoted by S = i2Si, and the set of
strategy combinations of the complement subset of players is denoted by  S
( S = NrS = i2NrSi). The set of pure strategy proles of all the players
is denoted by  ( = N).
Let  = (1;:::;n) 2  be a combination of pure strategies. The (m-
dimensional) congestion vector that corresponds to  is h = (h
e)e2M, where
h
e =

 fi 2 N : e 2 ig

 . The outcome from  is the subset X  M of the
service providers that have successfully executed their assigned tasks. For any
player i 2 N, if i \ X = ? then the disutility of player i from a strategy
prole  and the outcome X, i (;X), is equal to his incompletion cost, Wi;
otherwise, if X 6= ?, then the i's disutility is determined by the minimum
among the service costs of his successful resources:
i (;X) = min
e2i\X l
i
e(h

e):
Given a strategy prole , let X() denote the random variable representing
the subset of successful SPs; X() is distributed over the power set of the set
of chosen service providers, P([i2Ni), and its distribution is determined by
(fe)e2[i2Ni. The expected disutility of player i from strategy prole , i(),
is therefore:
i()=Wi
Y
e2i
fe +
X
A2P(i)rf?g
min
e2A l
i
e(h

e)
Y
e2A
se
Y
e2irA
fe:
We use the convention that
Q
e2? fe = 1. Hence, if agent i chooses an empty set
i = ? (does not assign his task to any resource), then his expected disutility,
6i(?; i), equals his incompletion cost, Wi. The aim of each player is to
minimize his own expected disutility.
We note that the service cost of a particular resource to player i may be higher
than his incompletion cost, Wi. For instance, the service cost may consist of
two types of costs|an execution cost, bi
e, that represents a cost of processing
player i's task by service provider e, and a xed completion cost, a, that models
for example a payment to the network administrator for successful execution
of a task, by one or more of the service providers. It is natural to assume
that bi
e() is a nonnegative nondecreasing function satisfying bi
e(k)  Wi for all
i 2 N, e 2 M and 1  k  n. This means that the execution of a task does not
cost to a player more than its failure. W.l.o.g., one can also assume that for
any player i his incompletion cost Wi is higher than the xed completion cost
a. Otherwise, the obvious dominant strategy of player i is to avoid assigning
his task to any service provider. Despite the fact that a  Wi and bi
e(k)  Wi
for all 1  k  n, the service cost, li
e(k) = bi
e(k) + a, might be higher than
Wi. However, it is obvious that if li
e(1)  Wi for all e 2 M, then the dominant
strategy of player i is to avoid assigning his task to any service provider, i.e.
in this case player i can be actually ignored. Therefore, w.l.o.g., we assume
that such cases do not take place.
Remark 2 We note that CGFs with constant failure probabilities (i.e., fe(k) =
fe for all e 2 M and k = 1;:::;n) and a single service provider (m = 1) can
be reduced to congestion games with player-specic payo functions presented
in Milchtaich (1996a). If player i chooses strategy i = ?, then his disutility
is the constant Wi (Note that Wi is player-specic); otherwise, if he submits
his task to the single available service provider, e, then his expected disutility
is given by i() = Wife + li
e(h
e)(1   fe), which is a nondecreasing, player-
specic function of the congestion on e. This is equivalent to the choice between
two resources, when the cost of each resource is a (possibly constant) nonde-
creasing, player-specic function of its congestion, which is exactly the case in
Milchtaich (1996a). Observe that i() is nondecreasing since li
e() is nonde-
creasing and fe is a constant value. However, if failure probabilities depend on
the congestion, then i() may be non-monotonic.
Applying Remark 2, when discussing CGFs with constant failure probabilities,
we can restrict our attention to the case with 2 or more resources (m  2).
3 The Non-existence of a Potential Function and of a FIP
In this section we investigate the basic properties of congestion games with
failures. Specically, we observe that no CGF with symmetric failure proba-
bilities and service cost functions admits an (exact) potential function, thus
implying that the class of CGFs lies beyond the class of congestion games.
Furthermore, we show that these games, in general, do not possess even a
7weaker|generalized ordinal|potential, whose existence in a game is equiva-
lent to the so called \nite improvement property" (FIP) that guarantees that
any sequence of one-sided improving steps converges to a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium from any initial combination of players' strategies. We present an
example of a CGF in which such a sequence of improvements has a cycle.
3.1 Exact potential
Monderer and Shapley (1996) introduced the notion of potential function and
dened a potential game to be a game which possesses a potential function.
A potential function (or, an exact potential) is a real-valued function over the
set of pure strategy proles, with the property that the gain (or loss) of a
player shifting to another strategy while keeping the other players' strategies
unchanged is equal to the corresponding increment of the potential function.
That is, if   is a game in strategic form with a nite number of players, where
the set of strategies of player i is i, the set of strategy proles is  = ii,
and the payo function of player i is i :  ! R, then a function P :  ! R
is an (exact) potential for   if for every player i and for every  i 2  i,
i( i;x)   i( i;y) = P( i;x)   P( i;y);
for any x;y 2 i. The authors (Monderer and Shapley (1996)) showed that
the classes of nite potential games and congestion games coincide.
In this section we show that the class of CGFs does not possess a potential
function, and therefore is not isomorphic to the class of congestion games. In
particular, we show that no symmetric CGF (in which the failure probabilities,
the incompletion costs and the service costs do not depend on the service
provider or the player identity) 4 admits a potential function. To prove this
statement we employ the following technical characterization of a potential
game by Monderer and Shapley (1996): if   is a game in strategic form with
i :  ! R the payo function of player i, then   is a potential game if and
only if for every i;j 2 N, for every z 2  fi;jg, and for every xi;yi 2 i and
xj;yj 2 j,
i()   i() + j()   j() + i()   i() + j()   j() = 0;
where  = (xi;xj;z),  = (yi;xj;z),  = (yi;yj;z),  = (xi;yj;z). 5
If in a CGF all service cost functions are constant (we refer to such games
as \degenerate"), then the above characterization easily implies the existence
of a potential function (this follows from the fact that the expected disutility
4 See Section 6 for a detailed discussion.
5  !  !  !  !  is termed \ a simple closed path" of length 4.
8of each player in this case is independent of the choices of the other players).
In other cases, a potential function does not necessarily exist in CGFs. In
particular, it never exists in symmetric CGFs.
Proposition 3 A non-degenerate symmetric CGFs with constant failure prob-
abilities does not possess an exact potential function.
Proof: Let   be a non-degenerate symmetric CGF with f denoting the failure
probability of each resource, W standing for the incompletion cost of each
player, and l() representing the congestion-dependent service cost of each
resource to each player. Let k 2 f1;:::;n 1g be an arbitrary integer satisfying
l(k) < l(k + 1), and consider the simple closed path of length 4 which is
formed by  = (?;fe2g;z);  = (fe1g;fe2g;z);  = (fe1g;fe1;e2g;z);  =
(?;fe1;e2g;z), where z 2  f1;2g satises hz
e1 = hz
e2 = k  1. That is, each SP
is chosen by exactly k  1 players, excluding players 1 and 2. For instance, let
k 1 players in Nrf1;2g play fe1;e2g and all the others play ?. The expected
disutilities of the deviators (players 1 and 2) on the path  !  !  !  ! 
are presented in Figure 1. Exploring Figure 1, we get
fe2g fe1;e2g
? 1() = W 1() = W
2() = fW + (1   f)l(k) 2() = f2W + (1   f2)l(k)
fe1g 1() = fW + (1   f)1(k) 1() = fW + (1   f)1(k + 1)
2() = fW + (1   f)l(k) 2() = f2W + (1   f)l(k)
+f(1   f)l(k + 1)
Figure 1. The non-existence of a potential function in symmetric CGFs.
1()   1() + 2()   2() + 1()   1() + 2()   2() =
(1   f)
2 (l(k + 1)   l(k)) > 0;
which implies the non-existence of a potential function. 
Note that Proposition 3 is also true for many CGFs with congestion-dependent
failures but not to all such games. Also the proposition applies to CGFs with
symmetric service cost functions and failure probabilities but player-specic
incompletion costs (the same proof, with the changes required due to player-
specic incompletion costs, is valid).
Remark 4 Note that since there is no potential function in symmetric CGFs,
its absence is a result of the added features of the CGF's setting (namely,
the resource failures and the minimum operator in the players' objectives),
and not due to the player-specic service cost functions. Moreover, some, but
not many, non-degenerate CGFs with player-specic service costs possess a
9potential function. Such a game is demonstrated by the following example.
Example 5 Let   be a CGF in which two players N = f1;2g share a set of
two resources M = fe1;e2g. The incompletion cost of each player is W = 10,
the failure probability of each resource is f = 0:5 and the service cost function
is given by l1
e1(1) = 2, l1
e1(2) = 4; l2
e1(1) = 8, l2
e1(2) = 10; and l1
e2(1) = l1
e2(2) =
l2
e2(1) = l2
e2(2) = 10. Figure 2 presents the payo matrix of the game. A
potential function of the game is presented in Figure 3.
? fe1g fe2g fe1;e2g
? (10;10) (10;9) (10;10) (10;9)
fe1g (6;10) (7;10) (6;10) (7;10)
fe2g (10;10) (10;9) (10;10) (10;9)
fe1;e2g (6;10) (7;10) (6;10) (7;10)
Figure 2. Players' payos in  .
? fe1g fe2g fe1;e2g
? 4 3 4 3
fe1g 0 0 0 0
fe2g 4 3 4 3
fe1;e2g 0 0 0 0
Figure 3. A potential function of  .
By exploring Figures 2 and 3, one can verify that for any two strategy proles
diering by the choice of exactly one player, the dierence in the payo of
that player between the two proles equals the corresponding increment in the
function presented in Figure 3. Therefore, this function is a potential function.
One can easily see that any local optimum of a potential function of a nite
potential game is a Nash equilibrium strategy prole as no player can im-
prove his payo by an unilateral deviation from this prole. Moreover, any
sequence of myopic improving deviations will converge to such a local opti-
mum, regardless of where the process has started. This is called the nite
improvement property (Monderer and Shapley, 1996).
3.2 (Generalized) ordinal potential and the FIP
Note that the convergence of a myopic improvement dynamics is guaranteed
even by a weaker type of a potential function, for which it is only required that
10increase in the utility of a player who unilaterally shifts to another strategy
implies increase in the potential function; thus, the potential increases along
the improvement path, and the nite improvement property holds. This type of
a potential is termed generalized ordinal potential, and it has been shown that
its existence in a game is equivalent to the FIP (Monderer and Shapley, 1996).
Below we show that this property, in general, does not hold for congestion
games with failures.
Theorem 6 There exist CGFs with no nite improvement property.
Proof: Let   be a CGF with 2 players N = f1;2g sharing 4 resources M =
fe1;e2;e3;e4g, the failure probability of each of which is given by f < 1. The
incompletion costs of both players are W1 = W2 = 2. The service costs are
given by l1
e1(1) = l2
e4(1) = 1, l1
e1(2) = l2
e4(2) = 3, and the rest take value 2
(i.e., for any k = 1;2 we have li
e(k) = 2 for e = e2;e3;e4 when i = 1, and
for e = e1;e2;e3 when i = 2). Consider the cycle of better replies which is
formed by  = (fe1;e2;e3;e4g;fe1;e3g) !  = (fe2;e3g;fe1;e3g) !  =
(fe2;e3g;fe2;e4g) !  = (fe1;e2;e3;e4g;fe2;e4g) !  (see Figure 4).
e1 e2 e3 e4
1 1 1 1
2 2
2 1 1
2
1 1 2
2
1 1 1 1
2 2
1 1 1 1
2 2
Figure 4. Example for the CGF without FIP.
The expected disutilities of the deviators satisfy the following:
1() = 2 + f
3(1   f) > 2 = 1()
2() = 2 > 1 + f = 2()
1() = 2 > 1 + f = 1()
2() = 2 + f(1   f) > 2 = 2();
11implying that  !  !  !  !  is indeed a better reply cycle. 6 
Thus, CGFs have no FIP and have no generalized ordinal potential function.
4 Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria and Best Reply Dynamics
We have shown in Section 3 that congestion games with failures have no FIP
and no generalized ordinal potential function. Note, however, that this fact, in
general, does not contradict the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies
or the convergence of particular one-sided better reply dynamics (e.g., best
responses). In this section, we prove that any sequence of best responses al-
ways converges in CGFs, thus implying the existence of a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in these games. Moreover, we provide an ecient algorithm for its
construction, and show that given a CGF, its dierent equilibria correspond
to (almost) the same congestion vector.
4.1 Existence and Convergence
We start by proving an intuitive and useful property of CGFs (see Proposition
7 below) which is the basis of our algorithm for constructing a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 7 Let  2  be a pure strategy prole of a given CGF, and
let h be its corresponding congestion vector. The strategy prole  is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if the following conditions are satised for all i 2 N:
(i) l
i
e(h

e)  Wi 8e 2 i;
(ii)l
i
e(h

e + 1)  Wi 8e = 2 i: (1)
Note that if h
e = n then fi 2 N : e = 2 ig = ?, and (1)(ii) is satised
vacuously.
Proof: ()) Suppose  is a Nash equilibrium pure strategy prole then we
prove that  satises inequalities (1).
(i) Suppose there is a player i 2 N such that the subset Li = fe 2 i :
li
e(h
e) > Wig of his chosen resources is not empty. Let a 2 Li be such a
resource with maximum service cost, that is, a 2 argmaxe2Li li
e(h
e) (note
that since li
e(h
e)  Wi for all e 2 i r Li, we have that li
a(h
a)  li
e(h
e) for
all e 2 i). We show below that i() > i( i;i r fag), i.e. player i can
improve his expected disutility by removing resource a from his strategy,
6 Though the rst inequality is not satised by every f, it does hold for all f  3
4;
the rest are true for any f < 1.
12which contradicts  2 NE. To prove this we show, on a sample path basis,
that the above deviation is protable for i. That is, for each realization of
the resource failures, player i's disutility obeying his modied strategy, is
at most as in his original strategy, and there exists a realization for which
his disutility is strictly smaller. For any given realization, let X denote the
outcome from the strategy prole |the subset of SPs that have succeeded
to execute their tasks, and let i(;X) be player i's disutility from  and
X. If all SPs have failed to execute their tasks (the subset of successful
resources is empty, X = ?) then i(;?) = i(( i;i r a);?) = Wi. If
X = fag, then player i benets from removing a from his set of utilized
SPs: i (( i;i r fag);X) = Wi < li
a(h
a) = i(;X). If X 6= ?;fag,
then i (( i;i r fag);X) = mine2(irfag)\X li
e(h
e) = mine2i\X li
e(h
e) =
i(;X). Therefore, i( i;irfag) < i(), contradicting  being a Nash
equilibrium strategy prole.
(ii) Suppose there are player i and service provider a 2 M r i such that
li
a(h
a + 1) < Wi. We show below that i() > i( i;i [ fag), which
contradicts  2 NE.
We denote ( i;i [ fag) by 0. If all SPs have failed to execute their
assigned tasks, then the i's disutility from both  and 0 is equal to his
incompletion cost, Wi. If all the resources, excluding resource a, have failed
(X = fag), then the i's disutility from 0 is less than the one from :
(0;X) = li
a(h0
a ) = li
a(h
a + 1) < Wi = (;X). If X 6= ?;fag, then
(0;X) = mine2(i[fag)\X li
e(h0
e )  mine2i\X li
e(h
e) = (;X) (note that
h0
e = h
e for all e 2 M r fag). Therefore, i(0) < i(), contradicting 
being a Nash equilibrium strategy prole.
(() Let  be a strategy prole that satises conditions (1). We prove that 
is a Nash equilibrium, that is, i ()  i ( i;0
i) for each player i 2 N and
for all 0
i 2 i.
Let i 2 N be any player and let 0
i 2 i be any strategy of player i. We denote
( i;0
i) by 0 and note that
h
0
e =
8
> <
> :
h
e e 2 i \ 0
i;
h
e + 1 e 2 0
i r i:
We show that for any realization of the resource failures, player i's payo from
obeying  is no worse than his payo from 0, implying  is an equilibrium. For
a given realization, let X represent the (possibly empty) subset of successful
service providers and note that i(;X)  Wi (this is since if i \ X = ?
then i(;X) = Wi; otherwise, i(;X) = mine2i\X li
e(h
e) (1)(i) Wi). If
i\0
i\X = ? then i(0;X)  Wi  i(;X) (if 0
i\X = ? then i(0;X) =
Wi; otherwise, i(0;X) = mine20
i\X li
e(h0
e ) (1)(ii) Wi). Otherwise, if i \
0
i \ X 6= ?, then i(0;X) = mine20
i\X li
e(h0
e ) =(1) mine2i\0
i\X li
e(h
e) 
mine2i\X li
e(h
e) = i(;X) (the equality holds since li
e(h
e) (1)(i) Wi (1)(ii)
13li
e0(h
e0 +1) = li
e0(h0
e0) for any e 2 i \0
i and e0 2 0
i ri; the inequality is due
to i \0
i \X  i \X). Therefore, i()  i(0) for all i 2 N and 0
i 2 i,
as claimed. That is,  is a Nash equilibrium strategy prole. 
Remark 8 Proposition 7 reects the idea that a player's decision regarding
any SP, that is, to sign up or not to an SP, in an equilibrium outcome is
independent of his decisions regarding other SPs, and is a function of his
incompletion cost and the service cost of that SP. In addition, the proposi-
tion implies that the equilibrium outcomes are independent of the values of
resource failure probabilities. Thus, Proposition 7 also holds for CGF-models
with congestion-dependent failure probabilities.
Based on Proposition 7, at any strategy prole of a given CGF, a best re-
sponse of a player to his opponents' chosen strategies is uniquely dened by
his incompletion cost and the congestion on the resources caused by the rest
of the players. We now show that any sequence of best replies always con-
verges to a Nash equilibrium prole, regardless of the initial point at which
the improvement process has started. This property is termed the nite best
response property (FBRP) (Milchtaich (1996a)).
Theorem 9 Every congestion game with failures has the FBRP.
Proof: On the contrary, assume there exists a game with a cyclic path of
best responses. Fix such a game and such a cycle, and an arbitrary service
provider, e, which is involved in this cycle. Consider changes made to e along
the best response path; since changes made to other service providers have
no eect on e, without loss of generality, we can focus on only those steps at
which a player have added or dropped resource e. Note that since the game is
nite with n players, the cycle must include both adds and drops, so x any
add with resource e and let it be the starting point, denoted 0.
Consider the function P BR() = L  W max() + nmax(), where L is a large
number so that mini;j2N:Wi6=Wj jWi   Wjj  L > n; W max is the maximal in-
completion cost among all users of e: W max() = maxi2N:e2i Wi; and nmax
is the number of e's users with the maximal incompletion cost: nmax() =
jfi 2 Nje 2 i;Wi = W max()gj.
First, observe that the function P BR does not decrease along the best response
path. Recall that at step 0 some player adds resource e. By Proposition 7, the
incompletion cost of the deviator has to be at least as great as the service cost
of e at 0. By denition, the same holds for any player i with Wi = W max(0).
Hence, no such player will drop resource e (meaning that W max, nmax, and
hence P BR, will not decrease), unless its service cost exceeds W max(0). But
for this to happen, a player with a higher incompletion cost must add resource
e, implying that W max strictly increases. Note that the terms in the function
P BR are scaled in a way that any possible change in W max is greater by the
absolute value then the total number of players, n. So, any time W max grows,
14the function P BR grows too, although nmax could decrease. Next, we show that
either P BR strictly increases along the improvement path, or there is another
(very similar) function that does. This will complete the proof.
If P BR is strictly increasing, we are done. So assume otherwise. Recall that
the function can only stay unchanged if no one of the nmax(0) users of e with
the maximal incompletion cost at 0 made any change along the improvement
path. Therefore, we can \ignore" those players and either remove them from
the game and modify the service cost functions of the rest of the players
accordingly, or, alternatively, consider a function P BR
(2) () = L  W max
(2) () +
nmax
(2) (), where W max
(2) and nmax
(2) are dened in a similar way, but for the 2nd
highest incompletion cost, and repeat the argument with respect to P BR
(2) .
Since the game is nite, there exists P BR
(k) for k = 1;:::;n (dened similarly
for the kth highest incompletion cost) that strictly increases along the cycle,
in contradiction to the contrary assumption. 
Theorem 9 implies that every CGF possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium,
and it can be achieved by a sequence of best replies. However, it gives no
guarantees on how long such an improvement dynamics may take. In what
follows, we strengthen the result of Theorem 9 by showing that xing the
initial strategy prole and the order of players in which they apply their best
responses, one can easily obtain an equilibrium in time, polynomial in the
number of players and service providers.
4.2 Ecient Construction
We develop the NE-Algorithm for constructing Nash equilibria in CGFs. The
algorithm is initialized with an empty strategy set for each player. At each
iteration, the algorithm selects (arbitrarily) a service provider. Then it sorts
the players in a non-increasing order of their maximum congestion for which
the service cost of a player for using this service provider is less than his
incompletion cost. If the ordering number of the player is at most the above
value of the congestion, then the algorithm adds the selected service provider
to the player's strategy set. In such a way, at the end of the algorithm, for
each i, the service cost of player i for using any of the SPs in i is lower than
Wi, while utilizing any other SP costs him more. Then, by Proposition 7, in
such situations no player wishes to deviate (unilaterally) from his strategy.
The NE-Algorithm is presented below.
4.2.1 NE-Algorithm
15Initiali-
zation: For all 1  i  n, set i := ?;
Main For all e 2 M:
step: (1) Sort the players in a non-increasing
order of ki
e, where
ki
e =
8
> <
> :
0 if fk : Wi > li
e(k); k = 1;:::;ng = ?
maxfk : Wi > li
e(k); k = 1;:::;ng otherwise;
Let 'e : N ! f1;:::;ng
i 7! ie = 'e(i)
be the corresponding permutation function;
(2) For ie = 1 to n:
if ie  ki
e, then i := i [ feg.
Theorem 10 The NE-algorithm nds a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a
given CGF with time complexity of O(mnlogn).
Proof: Validity Let us rst briey describe the intuition behind the proof.
For any resource e and for any player i we show that if the algorithm assigns
player i's task to resource e then the total congestion experienced by e in
the outcome of the algorithm is at most ki
e. By the denition of ki
e, player is
service cost for using resource e is less than the Wi, as required. Otherwise,
if the algorithm does not assign player i's task to resource e, then we show
that the total congestion on e in the algorithm's outcome, increased by 1, is
greater than ki
e, implying that the service cost of e is at least Wi, as required.
The formal proof is presented below.
Let  = (i)i2N be the combination of pure strategies constructed by the
NE-Algorithm, and let h = (h
e)e2M be the corresponding congestion vector.
Choose any service provider e and any player i. If e 2 i then h
e  1 and
ki
e  k' 1
e (x)
e , where
x = max
j2N f'e(j) : e 2 jg = h

e:
Since e 2 x, then k' 1
e (x)
e  x and ki
e  k' 1
e (x)
e  x = h
e. By the denition
of ki
e, for all 1  k  ki
e, we have Wi > li
e(k). Thus, since 1  h
e  ki
e, we get
Wi > li
e(h
e).
16If e = 2 i then ki
e  k' 1
e (y)
e , where
y = min
j2Nf'e(j) : e = 2 jg = max
j2N f'e(j) : e 2 jg + 1 = h

e + 1:
Since e = 2 y, then k' 1
e (y)
e < y, and ki
e  k' 1
e (y)
e < y = h
e + 1. By the
denition of ki
e, for all k > ki
e, we have Wi  li
e(k). Thus, since h
e + 1 > ki
e,
we get Wi  li
e(h
e + 1).
Hence, the congestion vector h satises the conditions in (1). Therefore, by
Proposition 7,  is a Nash equilibrium strategy prole.
Complexity The number of iterations of the NE-algorithm is m, where each
iteration takes O(nlogn) operations. Hence, the time complexity of the NE-
algorithm is O(mnlogn). 
Therefore, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a given CGF is easy to be
found. It turns out, that equilibrium points in CGFs have some additional
nice properties, as is shown in the sequel.
4.3 (Almost) Uniqueness
We now discuss some uniqueness properties of Nash equilibria in CGFs. More
precisely, we consider the uniqueness of congestion experienced by any service
provider in any equilibrium. The uniqueness of equilibrium may fail due to
indierence in the choice between strategies. Hence we conne our attention
to games with strictly increasing service cost functions. We show that in such
CGFs the dierence between the congestion experienced by any SP in any
two dierent Nash equilibria is bounded by 1. Furthermore, in games with
li
e() 6= Wi, for all e and i, any SP has the same congestion in all equilibrium
proles. In particular, all generic CGFs have this uniqueness property. Let
NE   be a set of Nash equilibrium pure strategy proles. Then,
Proposition 11 Given a CGF, if for all e 2 M and i 2 N, li
e() is a strictly
increasing monotone function, then for any pair of equilibrium proles 1;2 2
NE, the inequality jh1
e   h2
e j  1 holds for all e 2 M.
Proof: Let 1;2 2 NE be Nash equilibrium strategy proles, and assume
that h1
e > h2
e + 1 for some e 2 M. Then, there is a player i such that
e 2 1
i, but e = 2 2
i. By Proposition 7, for player i we have li
e(h1
e )  Wi and
li
e(h2
e +1)  Wi. Therefore, li
e(h1
e )  li
e(h2
e +1). Now, h1
e > h2
e +1 coupled
with the monotonicity of li
e(), leads to li
e(h1
e ) > li
e(h2
e + 1), in contradiction
to li
e(h1
e )  li
e(h2
e + 1). 
It can be easily seen that if in addition to the requirements of Proposition
11, the cost function li
e() satises li
e(k) 6= Wi for 1  k  n, then all Nash
equilibria of a given CGF correspond to the same congestion vector, i.e. the
congestion of any SP is xed for all equilibrium points.
175 Semi-strong Nash Equilibria in CGFs
In the previous section we proved that CGFs, while not admitting a potential
function, always possess a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. An equilibrium
strategy prole has the property that, once it has been agreed upon, no player
has an incentive to deviate unilaterally. This interpretation has been criticized
on various grounds (see, e.g., Aumann (1990)). In particular, if the coalition
of the whole can communicate to agree on a particular strategy choice, then
smaller coalitions may also be able to communicate and coordinate their ac-
tions. According to this line of argument, one should not be satised with
strategy proles that are immune only to individual deviations, but instead
should insist also on immunity to deviations of coalitions. These considerations
have led to new solution concepts of strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann (1959))
and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim et al. (1987); Bernheim and
Whinston (1987)). Milgrom and Roberts (1996) focused on coalition devia-
tions that are robust against further individual deviations. They called the
corresponding Nash equilibria strongly coalition proof. The same concept has
been proposed by Kaplan (1992), who called the equilibria semi-strong.
Strong Nash equilibrium is a strategy prole for which there is no protable
deviation available to any coalition of players. This requirement is too strong
since the prole must be resistant to deviations which are not themselves re-
sistant to further deviations. The notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium,
instead, requires only that a strategy prole be immune to protable devi-
ations which are self-enforcing 7 . Strongly coalition-proof (or, semi-strong)
Nash equilibrium is a strategy prole for which there are no protable coali-
tion deviations which are robust against further individual deviations (we
dene these equilibria more precisely below). Given a semi-strong Nash equi-
librium, one expects no coalition deviations, since any such deviation is not
an equilibrium among the members of coalition. 8
In this section, we show the existence of semi-strong Nash equilibria in the
class of CGFs. Moreover, we show that every best Nash equilibrium of a given
CGF is semi-strong.
Denition 12 Let   = (N;;(i())i2N) be a game in strategic form, where
N denotes the set of players,  denotes the set of strategy proles, and i
denotes the disutility function of player i 2 N. A prole  is a semi-strong
Nash equilibrium if
(i)  is a Nash equilibrium of  , and
7 A deviation is self-enforcing if there is no further self-enforcing and protable
deviation available to a proper sub-coalition of players.
8 Obviously, every strong equilibrium is semi-strong, and every semi-strong equi-
librium is coalition-proof.
18(ii) for every S  N, S 6= ?, and every Nash equilibrium S of  S;, where
 S; = (S;(i)i2S;(i( S;))i2S) is the reduced game of   w.r.t S and ,
there exists i 2 S such that i()  i(S; S).
We restrict our attention to CGFs with service cost functions satisfying li
e(k) 6=
Wi, for all e 2 M, i 2 N, k 2 f1;:::;ng. That is, we assume that a player
is never indierent between adding or ignoring a particular service provider.
Let  be a Nash equilibrium strategy prole that minimizes the sum of the
players' disutilities, then  is termed a best Nash Equilibrium. (See 6.2 for
a detailed discussion on best Nash-equilibria.) The following theorem states
that any best Nash Equilibrium is semi-strong.
Theorem 13 Let G be a CGF satisfying li
e(k) 6= Wi, for all e 2 M, i 2 N,
k 2 f1;:::;ng, and let  be a best Nash equilibrium . Then,  is a semi-strong
Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof: Assume on the contrary that there exists S  N, S 6= ?, and a Nash
equilibrium S of  S; such that i(S; S) < i(), for all i 2 S. Since S
is a Nash equilibrium of  S;, then, by Proposition 7, for all i 2 S,
(i) l
i
e(h
(S; S)
e ) < Wi 8e 2 i; (2)
(ii)l
i
e(h
(S; S)
e + 1) > Wi 8e 2 M r i: (3)
If there exists a service provider e 2 M such that h(S; S)
e < h
e, then there is
a player i 2 S with e 2 i r i. Hence,
h
(S; S)
e < h

e ) h
(S; S)
e + 1  h

e ) l
i
e

h
(S; S)
e + 1

 l
i
e (h

e): (4)
Since  is a Nash equilibrium of   and e 2 i, then by Proposition 7,
l
i
e (h

e) < Wi )(4) l
i
e

h
(S; S)
e + 1

< Wi;
in contradiction to e = 2 i and (3).
If there exists a service provider e 2 M such that h(S; S)
e > h
e, then there is
a player i 2 S with e 2 i r i. Then,
h
(S; S)
e > h

e ) h
(S; S)
e  h

e + 1 ) l
i
e

h
(S; S)
e

 l
i
e (h

e + 1): (5)
Since  is a Nash equilibrium of   and e = 2 i, then by Proposition 7,
l
i
e (h

e + 1) > Wi )(5) l
i
e

h
(S; S)
e

> Wi;
in contradiction to e 2 i and (2).
Otherwise, h(S; S)
e = h
e, for all e 2 M. Then, i(S; S) = i() for all
i = 2 S and i(S; S) < i() for all i 2 S, which implies
P
j2N j(S; S) <
P
j2N j(). That is, the sum of the players' disutilities from (S; S) is
19strictly less than the one from . In addition, since S is a Nash equilibrium
of  S;, then inequalities (2) and (3) hold for all i 2 S; since  is a Nash
equilibrium of   and h(S; S)
e = h
e for all e 2 M, then Proposition 7 implies
that (2) and (3) hold for all i = 2 S. Thus, (2) and (3) hold for all i 2 N, implying
that (S; S) is a Nash equilibrium of   (by Proposition 7), in contradiction
to  being a best Nash equilibrium of  . 
6 Symmetric CGFs
In this section, we consider the properties of Nash equilibria in symmetric
CGFs. In a symmetric CGF, the parameters of the game do not depend on
service provider or player identity, i.e. for all i 2 N and e 2 M we have
Wi = W, fe = f, and li
e(k) = l(k), for all k 2 f1;:::;ng. Recall that if
l(1)  W then the dominant strategy of each player is to avoid assigning a
task. Therefore, it is assumed that l(1) < W.
First, we show that in symmetric CGFs all SPs have almost the same conges-
tion at Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we characterize and compare best and
worst equilibria in symmetric CGFs, and provide ecient simple algorithms
for their construction. We also evaluate the ineciency of Nash equilibrium in
these games by considering the (best and worst possible) ratio between Nash
equilibrium and optimum outcomes.
6.1 (Almost) Even Congestion
We start by showing that as a result of the symmetry among service providers
in symmetric CGFs, the SPs are (almost) evenly congested in any equilibrium.
Let k = maxfk : l(k) < W;k = 1;:::;ng and k = maxfk : l(k)  W;k =
1;:::;ng. Then,
Proposition 14 Given a symmetric CGF, let  2 NE be a Nash equilibrium
strategy prole with its corresponding congestion vector h. Then, k  h
e  k
for all e 2 M.
Proof: Assume on the contrary that h
a < k for some a 2 M. Then, h
a+1  k,
implying l(h
a + 1) < W (by the monotonicity of l() and the denition of k).
Since h
a < k  n then a = 2 i for some i 2 N. Then, Proposition 7 implies
l(h
a + 1)  W, a contradiction.
Assume now that h
b > k for some b 2 M. Then, l(h
b) > W (by the mono-
tonicity of l() and the denition of k). Since h
b > k  1 then b 2 i for
some i 2 N. Then, Proposition 7 implies l(h
b)  W, a contradiction. 
Note that if l() strictly increases with the number of users then k   k  1.
Then, Corollary 15 follows directly from Proposition 14.
20Corollary 15 Given a symmetric CGF, if l(k) is a strictly increasing mono-
tone function on the interval 1  k  k, then at any Nash equilibrium
 2 NE, the dierence between the congestions of dierent SPs is bounded by
1, i.e. for all  2 NE and for all a;b 2 M, the inequality jh
a  h
bj  1 holds.
As we can see, symmetric CGFs have the property that all resources suer
almost the same congestion, regardless of the particular equilibrium the play-
ers may converge to. Hence, the load on the system is expected to be fairly
distributed among the resources.
6.2 Best and Worst Equilibria
Given a prole , dene the (expected) social disutility () as the sum of
the players' expected disutilities in this strategy prole: () =
P
i2N i().
Social disutility is a standard mean to measure the cost suered by the society
as a whole. A strategy prole that minimizes the social disutility over the set
of strategy proles is called a social optimum. A best (worst) equilibrium is a
strategy prole that minimizes (maximizes) the social disutility over the set
of equilibrium strategies. Let BNE  NE (WNE  NE) denote the subset
of all best (worst) pure strategy Nash equilibria. The social disutility in a
best equilibrium describes the best result that can be obtained in a system
with noncooperative selsh players. This notion is of particular interest when
there exists a mediator who can suggest rational players a particular behavior.
Such behavior should be stable against unilateral deviations, but the mediator
can choose it to be the best behavior among the stable points. The worst
equilibrium is of particular interest when no such mediator exists, and one is
interested in the worst rational behavior the system may converge to.
In this section we characterize, construct and compare best and worst Nash
equilibria in symmetric CGFs. Specically, we show that the values of the
social disutility in best and worst equilibrium points are very close. The ratios
between these values and the optimum social disutility are discussed in the
following subsection. We start by providing two lemmas that will be needed
in the sequel.
Lemma 16 Given a symmetric CGF, assume there exists  2 rf(?;:::;?)g
with maxe2M l(h
e)  W. Let a 2 argmaxe2M l(h
e). Then, for any i 2 N,
^  = ( i;i r fag) satises (^ )  ().
Proof: Let i 2 N. If a = 2 i, then clearly (^ )  (). Otherwise a 2 i
and the strategy prole ^  is obtained from  by removing resource a from the
strategy set of player i. As a result, the congestion on resource a is reduced by
1, and the other resources' congestion is unchanged. Then, by the monotonicity
of l(), the expected disutility of any player k 6= i can not increase. It remains
to show that player i's expected disutility, i, does not increase as well.
21For any realization of resource failures, as before, let X be the subset of all
successful SPs. If a = 2 X then ^ i \ X = (i r fag) \ X = i \ X, and hence
i(^ ;X) = i(;X). If i \ X = fag then ^ i \ X = ? and i(^ ;X) = W 
l(h
a) = i(;X). Otherwise, if a ( i \ X then ^ i \ X 6= ? and i(^ ;X) =
mine2^ i\X l(h
e) = mine2(irfag)\X l(h
e) =a2argmaxe2M l(h
e) mine2i\X l(h
e) =
i(;X). Therefore, the expected disutility of i satises (^ )  (), on a
sample path basis. 
Lemma 16 reects the simple idea that keeping resources with high service
costs is not benecial for the society. The following lemma, Lemma 17, cap-
tures the idea that strategy proles which are better for the society are also
fair 9 ones.
Lemma 17 Given a symmetric CGF, let  2  be a combination of strategies
satisfying l(h
e)  W for all e 2 M. If there are two players i;j 2 N such that
jij > jjj + 1, then the strategy prole ^  = ( fi;jg;i r fbg;j [ fbg), where
b 2 argmaxe2irj h
e, satises (^ )  ().
The proof of Lemma 17 is technical and relatively lengthy, therefore we have
chosen to present it in the Appendix.
Now we are ready to study best and worst equilibria in symmetric games.
Recall that k = maxfk : l(k) < W;k = 1;:::;ng, and let    be the
subset of all pure strategy proles satisfying the following conditions: for all
 2 ,
h

e = k 8e 2 M;


jij   jjj


  1 8i;j 2 N: (6)
Assume  is not empty and let  2 . Since the congestion on each service
provider in  equals k, then
P
i2N jij = mk. Also, since in  all the players
use (almost) the same number of resources,  has the following structure: x
players choose bmk
n c service providers and y players choose bmk
n c + 1 service
providers, where x and y satisfy the following equations:
8
> <
> :
xbmk
n c + y(bmk
n c + 1) = mk
x + y = n:
Therefore, the values of x and y are
x=n
 
b
mk
n
c + 1
!
  mk;
y =mk   nb
mk
n
c: (7)
9 By "fair" we mean that the resources are evenly distributed among the players.
22Note that if n divides mk, then x = n; y = 0.
Using the above characterization of proles in , one can apply the following
simple procedure to greedily allocate the resources to the players to get such
a prole, approving  is not empty.
6.2.1 BNE-Procedure
Number the players (resp., resources) by 1;:::;n (resp., 1;:::;m), and let x
and y be given by (7). Assign the rst bmk
n c resources to the rst player. Then
continue with the second player and assign him the next bmk
n c resources with
the lowest congestion, where the assignment is according to the resources'
numbers from the lowest to the highest. Continue until you have assigned the
allocated resources to the rst x players, bmk
n c resources each. Proceed assign-
ing the resources to the remaining y players by assigning each player bmk
n c+1
resources.
Thus, the set  is not empty and any solution obtained by the BNE Procedure
belongs to . The following proposition, Proposition 18, implies that every
prole in  is a best Nash equilibrium; that is, this simple procedure nds a
best equilibrium strategy prole in a given symmetric CGF.
Proposition 18 Let BNE be the subset of all best pure strategy Nash equi-
libria of a given symmetric CGF, then   BNE.
Proof: First, we show that every  2  is a Nash equilibrium strategy prole.
For all e 2 M, h
e = k, which implies l(h
e) = l(k) < W (by the denition of
k). That is, for all i 2 N and e 2 i we have l(h
e) < W. If k = n then e 2 i
for all i 2 N. Otherwise, by the denition of k, l(h
e +1) = l(k+1)  W. That
is, for all i 2 N and e = 2 i we have l(h
e + 1)  W. Hence, by Proposition 7,
 is a Nash equilibrium strategy prole. That is,   NE.
It remains to show that   BNE. We begin by showing that all proles in
 have the same social disutility. Let  2  and recall that x players in 
choose bmk
n c service providers and y players choose bmk
n c+1 service providers,
where x and y are given by (7). Thus, the social disutility of  equals
x 

Wf
b mk
n c + l(k)(1   f
b mk
n c)

+ y 

Wf
b mk
n c+1 + l(k)(1   f
b mk
n c+1)

:
This implies that (1) = (2) for all 1;2 2 . Therefore, to prove that
  BNE, it suces to show that  \ BNE 6= ?.
Let BNE1  BNE be the (nonempty) subset of all best Nash equilibria with
minimum total congestion on the resources. That is,
BNE1 = arg min
2BNE
X
e2M
h

e;
23and let BNE2  BNE1 be the (nonempty) subset of all best equilibria with
minimum total congestion and minimum sum of the dierences between the
cardinalities of the players' strategies:
BNE2 = arg min
2BNE1
X
fi;jg:i;j2N
 
jij   jjj
 
:
We show below that BNE2  , implying  \ BNE 6= ?.
Let  2 BNE2. If  2  we are done. Otherwise, there exists a resource
e 2 M with h
e 6= k (implying by Proposition 14 that h
e > k), or there
exist i;j 2 N such that jij > jjj + 1. Assume the former case and let a 2
argmaxe2M h
e. Note that l(h
a) = W (this is since h
a > k implies l(h
a)  W
and 9i 2 N with a 2 i, yielding l(h
a)  W by Proposition 7 and  2 NE).
Let i 2 N with a 2 i, and consider 0 = ( i;i r fag). Now, l(h
a) =
W implies l(h0
a )  W and l(h0
a + 1)  W. For any other resource e 2
M r fag, h0
e = h
e implies l(h0
e )  W and l(h0
e + 1)  W (or h0
e = n).
Then, by Proposition 7, 0 is a Nash equilibrium strategy prole. By Lemma
16, (0)  (), implying 0 2 BNE. Thus, since
P
e2M h0
e <
P
e2M h
e,
we get a contradiction to  2 BNE1. Therefore,  satises h
e = k for all
e 2 M. Now, since  = 2 , there exist i;j 2 N such that jij > jjj + 1.
Let 00 = ( fi;jg;i r fbg;j [ fbg), where b 2 i r j. We note that for all
e 2 M, h00
e = h
e = k yields l(h00
e ) < W and l(h00
e + 1)  W (or h00
e = n).
Then, by Proposition 7, 00 is a Nash equilibrium strategy prole. By Lemma
17, (00)  (), implying 00 2 BNE. In addition, since h00
e = k for all
e 2 M, then, by Proposition 14, 00 2 argmin2BNE
P
e2M h
e = BNE1. Thus,
P
fi;jg:i;j2N

 j00
i j   j00
jj

  <
P
fi;jg:i;j2N

 jij   jjj

  contradicts  2 BNE2. This
completes the proof. 
By Proposition 18, the BNE Procedure constructs a best equilibrium strategy
prole in which the players are distributed "evenly" over the service providers.
Hence, it is possible to suggest to the players rational behaviors, which are
fair, and also benet the society.
Next, in the following proposition, Proposition 19, we identify some worst
equilibria in symmetric CGFs. These equilibrium points have very simple form
and can be easily constructed, also in a greedily fashion, but in a dierent
way to the BNE Procedure. As opposed to the fairness property of a best
Nash equilibrium obtained by the BNE Procedure, the suggested worst Nash
equilibrium suers from the largest possible imparity among the players. The
proof of the following proposition follows similar lines to the ones used in the
proof of Proposition 18 above and thus appears in the Appendix. Recall that
k = maxfk : l(k)  W;k = 1;:::;ng. Note that if l(k) 6= W for all k, then
k = k.
Proposition 19 Given a symmetric CGF, let    be the subset of all
pure strategy proles in which exactly k players play M, n   k players play
24? and h
e = k for all e 2 M. Then,   WNE, where WNE denotes the
subset of all worst Nash equlibria.
Next we compare the best and the worst Nash equilibria. Let us denote the
social disutility of a best Nash equilibrium strategy prole by B, and the
worst one by W. Then,
W =k
 (Wf
m + l(k
)(1   f
m)) + (n   k
)W
=k
(1   f
m)(l(k
)   W) + nW;
B =x

Wf
b mk
n c + l(k)(1   f
b mk
n c)

+ y

Wf
b mk
n c+1 + l(k)(1   f
b mk
n c+1)

=f
b mk
n c(x + fy)(W   l(k)) + nl(k);
where x and y are given by (7).
Therefore, the ratio between the social disutilities in a worst and a best equi-
librium is
W
B
=
k(1   fm)(l(k)   W) + nW
fb mk
n c(x + fy)(W   l(k)) + nl(k)
:
Since l(k) < W and l(k)  W, we have that
W
B
<
nW
nl(k)
=
W
l(k)
:
This implies that the values of the social disutilities in dierent Nash equilib-
rium points lie in a very narrow range. In the context of social performance
of Nash equilibria, one has to ask how far these values are from the social
optimum.
6.3 Nash Equilibria and Social Optimum
In this section we discuss the social performance of Nash equilibria in con-
gestion games with failures. Previous results of Awerbuch et al. (2005) and
Christodoulou and Koutsoupias (2005) showed that the price of anarchy (the
worst possible ratio between social disutilities at an equilibrium and an opti-
mum outcome) of pure equilibria in congestion games with nonnegative linear
cost functions is 5
2. We show that in CGFs with such cost functions even the
best possible ratio between pure equilibrium and optimum social disutilities
("the price of stability") depends on the parameters of the game and cannot
be bounded by a constant value. As a result, the price of anarchy in CGFs does
not have a constant upper bound, implying that it is unbounded in general.
Consider the following example.
25Example 20 Suppose we have the set N of n  2 players sharing the set
M of m  2 service providers. Each service provider e 2 M has the failure
probability f, and the service cost of each SP for each player is l(k) = k, where
a is a xed completion cost and k 2 f1;:::;ng. The incompletion cost of each
player is W = n.
Recall that there is a best Nash equilibrium, , in which x players choose
bmk
n c service providers and y players choose bmk
n c+1 service providers, where
k = maxfk : l(k) < W; k = 1;:::;ng and x and y are given by (7). In our
example, k = n   1, which implies bmk
n c = m   dm
ne. The disutility of player
i 2 N at this point is given by

x
i()=f
m d m
n eW + (1   f
m d m
n e)l(n   1)
=f
m d m
n en + (1   f
m d m
n e)(n   1)
=n   (1   f
m d m
n e);
or 
y
i ()=f
m d m
n e+1W + (1   f
m d m
n e+1)l(n   1)
=f
m d m
n e+1n + (1   f
m d m
n e+1)(n   1)
=n   (1   f
m d m
n e+1);
with x
i()  
y
i(). Then, the social disutility of ,
() =
X
i2N
i()  n

n   (1   f
m d m
n e)

:
Consider the combination of strategies ^  that corresponds to the following
players' behavior: each player chooses only one SP and the players divide up
the SPs in a uniform way, i.e. each SP is chosen by n
m players (assume m
divides n). The disutility of player i 2 N at this point is
i(^ ) = fW + (1   f)l
 n
m

= fn + (1   f)
n
m
;
and the social disutility is
(^ ) =
X
i2n
i(^ ) = n

fn + (1   f)
n
m

:
Then, the ratio between the outcomes of a best Nash equilibrium and a social
optimum is
26()
(OPT)

()
(^ )

n

n   (1   fm d m
n e)

n

fn + (1   f) n
m
 =
n   (1   fm d m
n e)
fn + (1   f) n
m
=
m

n   (1   fm d m
n e)

fmn + (1   f)n
f!0
>
m(n   1)
n
n!1
> m:
This implies that the ratio between the disutilities in a best Nash equilibrium
and the social optimum (and therefore, the price of anarchy|the ratio be-
tween the social disutilities in a worst equilibrium and the social optimum) in
CGFs, unlike in congestion games, is not bounded above by a constant, but
is game-dependent. Therefore, the price of stability and the price of anarchy
are unbounded in general.
It is of interest to know, whether it is possible to nd an upper bound in terms
of the game parameters. To address this problem one has to deal with dierent
types of service cost functions (linear, polynomial etc.), and they may lead to
dierent bounds on the price of stability/anarchy. In addition, there is a need
to nd a method for evaluating an optimal social disutility, which appears
to be a non-trivial problem even in the symmetric games. We see evaluating
the price of stability/anarchy in CGFs as one of the most interesting and
challenging directions to continue our study.
7 Summary and Future Work
The study of congestion in systems is central to many disciplines. This conges-
tion may be a result of the actions taken by self-motivated participants, and
therefore congestion settings deserve extensive study. Surprisingly, although
the notion of machine failures is widely discussed in the OR and CS literature,
the relationships between congestion settings with self-motivated participants
and machine failures have hardly been studied. In order to address this need
we introduced in this paper the notion of Congestion Games with Failures
[CGFs]. As it turns out, this new setting leads to interesting observations
about the interplay between the need to deal with failures and the emergence
of congestion in non-cooperative systems. Indeed, the classical idea of using
several resources in order to overcome the possibility of failure, may result in
a highly congested system, hurting all players in the system.
Our results show that although CGFs do not possess a potential function, and
not even a generalized ordinal potential function, they always have a Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies. Moreover, although an arbitrary improvement
dynamics may cycle, any sequence of the players' best responses converges to an
equilibrium prole. We also propose a procedure that guarantees convergence
in polynomial time.
27We further explore the properties of pure strategy equilibria in CGFs. In
particular, for symmetric games we characterize best and worst equilibria and
show that best equilibria possess fairness properties. The disutilities of best
and worst equilibria are shown to be quite close to one another, while the
relation between their disutility and the optimal social disutility might be
unbounded, in dierence to the results known for standard congestion games.
Although the price of stability and the price of anarchy in CGFs are un-
bounded in general, it is a challenging question whether it is possible to nd
an upper bound in terms of the instance parameters. In addition, the ine-
ciency of Nash equilibria motivates the study of methods for improving the
social outcome obtained by selsh players. In this context, one may consider
the use of taxation in order to improve the social utility. Another interesting
direction is to characterize the semi-strong Nash-equilibria.
The model of CGFs can be extended in various ways. For instance, a natural
generalization is to introduce xed costs (or, taxes) that the players would be
required to pay for all service providers they use. As it turns out, incorporating
taxes signicantly complicates the model, and basic results such as Proposi-
tion 7, hold no more. However, for the special case with symmetric taxes and
failure probabilities we were able to prove the existence of a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium and develop a polynomial-time algorithm for its construc-
tion. These results are presented in a separate paper on Taxed Congestion
Games with Failures [TCGFs] (Penn et al., 2009b). We intend to continue
our study of the TCGF-model: in particular, it is a challenge to generalize
the model to allow for resource-dependent taxes and failure probabilities, and
explore the relations between the taxation scheme and the social welfare.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 17
Since jij > jjj + 1, then i r j is not empty, and let b 2 i r j be such
a resource with maximal service cost: b 2 argmaxe2irj l(h
e). We want to
show that if we take this resource from player i and give it to player j, the
social disutility of the players can only improve. Obviously, for all e 2 M,
h^ 
e = h
e (we will denote it by he). Then, since ^ k = k for all k 6= i;j,
we have k(^ ) = k(), for all k 6= i;j. Therefore, it suces to show that
i(^ ) + j(^ )  i() + j(). The sample path technique that we used in
the proofs of Proposition 7 and Lemma 16 is not valid here, and we operate
directly with expected disutilities.
30h
i() + j()
i
 
h
i(^ ) + j(^ )
i
= Wf
jij +
X
A02P(i)rf?g
min
e2A0 l(he)s
jA0jf
jirA0j
+Wf
jjj +
X
B2P(j)rf?g
min
e2B l(he)s
jBjf
jjrBj
 Wf
jij 1  
X
A2P(irfbg)rf?g
min
e2A l(he)s
jAjf
jirAj 1
 Wf
jjj+1  
X
B02P(j[fbg)rf?g
min
e2B0 l(he)s
jB0jf
jjrB0j+1:
For any set X, we henceforth denote by  P(X) the set of all nonempty subsets
of X:  P(X) = P(X) r f?g, and observe that the following equality holds for
every pair of sets X;Y :
 P(X) =  P(X \ Y ) [  P(X r Y ) [
n

 [ 	



 2  P(X \ Y );	 2  P(X r Y )
o
:
(8)
By (8), and since b 2 i r j,
 P(i) =  P(i r fbg) [ fbg [
n
A [ fbg
 
A 2  P(i r fbg)
o
;
 P(j [ fbg) =  P(j) [ fbg [
n
B [ fbg
 
B 2  P(j)
o
: (9)
Then, by (9),
h
i() + j()
i
 
h
i(^ ) + j(^ )
i
= Wf
jij 1(f   1) + Wf
jjj(1   f) + l(hb)sf
jij 1   l(hb)sf
jjj
+
X
A2  P(irfbg)
min
e2A l(he)s
jAjf
jirAj  
X
A2  P(irfbg)
min
e2A l(he)s
jAjf
jirAj 1
+
X
A2  P(irfbg)
min
e2A[fbg
l(he)s
jAj+1f
jirAj 1  
X
B2  P(j)
min
e2B l(he)s
jBjf
jjrBj+1
+
X
B2  P(j)
min
e2B l(he)s
jBjf
jjrBj  
X
B2  P(j)
min
e2B[fbg
l(he)s
jBj+1f
jjrBj:
Simplifying this expression, we get
h
i() + j()
i
 
h
i(^ ) + j(^ )
i
= s
" 
f
jjj   f
jij 1

(W   l(hb))
+
X
A2  P(irfbg)
s
jAjf
jirAj 1
 
min
e2A[fbg
l(he)   min
e2A l(he)
!
+
X
B2  P(j)
s
jBjf
jjrBj
 
min
e2B l(he)   min
e2B[fbg
l(he)
! #
:
31By (8), and since b 2 i r j,
 P(i r fbg)=  P(i \ j) [  P ((i r fbg) r j)
[
n

 [ A
0
 

 2  P(i \ j); A
0 2  P ((i r fbg) r j)
o
;
 P(j)=  P(i \ j) [  P (j r (i r fbg))
[
n

 [ B
0

 
 2  P(i \ j); B
0 2  P (j r (i r fbg))
o
:(10)
Then, by (10),
h
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jjj   f
jij 1)

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+
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:
Let X  M represent any (even empty) set of resources. Then,
 f(X); s(X)  0 (as probabilities);
 f(j r X)   f ((i r fbg) r X) > 0 (follows from jij > jjj + 1);
 W  l(hb) (given);
 lX(hX)  lX[fbg(hX[fbg) (since X  X [ fbg);
 from the choice of b, for all e 2 i r j, l(he)  l(hb)
) for all Y 2  P(i r j) (and, in particular, for Y 2  P ((i r fbg) r j)),
lY [X[fbg(hY [X[fbg) = lY [X(hY [X).
Therefore, we nally get
h
i() + j()
i
 
h
i(^ ) + j(^ )
i
 0, as required.

B. Proof of Proposition 19
Clearly  is not empty, and all strategy proles in  have the same social
disutility k (Wfm + l(k)(1   fm)). We turn now to show that every  2 
is a Nash equilibrium strategy prole. For all e 2 M, h
e = k, implying
32l(h
e) = l(k)  W (by the denition of k). Hence, for all i 2 N and e 2 i
we have l(h
e)  W. If k = n then e 2 i for all i 2 N. Otherwise, by the
denition of k and the symmetry, l(h
e +1) = l(k +1) > W for each e 2 M.
That is, for all i 2 N and e = 2 i we have l(h
e +1) > W. Then, by Proposition
7,  is a Nash equilibrium strategy prole. That is,   NE.
It remains to prove that   WNE. Since (1) = (2) for all 1;2 2
, it suces to show that  \ WNE 6= ?. Let WNE1  WNE be the
(nonempty) subset of all worst Nash equilibria with maximum total congestion
on the resources. That is,
WNE1 = arg max
2WNE
X
e2M
h

e;
and let WNE2  WNE1 be the (nonempty) subset of all worst equilibria
with maximum total congestion and maximum sum of the dierences between
the cardinalities of the players' strategies:
WNE2 = arg max
2WNE1
X
fi;jg:i;j2N

 jij   jjj

 :
We show below that WNE2  , implying  \ WNE 6= ?. Let  2
WNE2. If  2  we are done. Otherwise, if there exists a resource a 2 M
such that h
a 6= k then by Proposition 14 h
a < k  n. Let i 2 N be a player
with a = 2 i, and consider 0 = ( i;i [ fag). Since  is a Nash equilibrium
strategy prole, by Proposition 7, l(h
a + 1)  W, implying l(h0
a + 1)  W.
In addition, h
a < k yields l(h0
a )  l(k)  W. For any other resource
e 2 M r fag, h0
e = h
e implies l(h0
e )  W and l(h0
e + 1)  W (or h0
e = n).
Thus, by Proposition 7, 0 is a Nash equilibrium strategy prole. We note
that l(h
a + 1) = l(h0
a )  W, coupled with the denition of k, imply that
l(h0
a )  l(k)  l(h
e) = l(h0
e ) for all e 2 M r fag. Then, by Lemma 16,
(0)  (), implying 0 2 WNE. Thus, since
P
e2M h0
e >
P
e2M h
e, we get
a contradiction to  2 WNE1. Therefore,  satises h
e = k for all e 2 M.
Then, since  = 2 , there exist i;j 2 N such that i;j 6= ?;M (w.l.o.g.,
assume that jij  jjj). Let 00 = ( fi;jg;irfbg;j[fbg), where b 2 irj.
We note that for all e 2 M, h00
e = h
e yields l(h00
e )  W and l(h00
e +1)  W (or
h00
e = n), implying that 00 is a Nash equilibrium strategy prole. By Lemma
17, (00)  (), implying 00 2 WNE. In addition, since h00
e = k for
all e 2 M, then, by Proposition 14, 00 2 argmax2WNE
P
e2M h
e = WNE1.
Thus,
P
fi;jg:i;j2N


j00
i j j00
jj


 >
P
fi;jg:i;j2N


jij jjj


 contradicts  2 WNE2.
This completes the proof. 
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